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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
While the World Trade Organization (WTO) does not regulate the field of 
foreign investment, the WTO has tried to negotiate multilateral rules on foreign 
investment in the past, and there are other current international agreements that 
contain investment provisions designed to regulate foreign investment.1 Even 
though the previous multilateral investment agreement negotiations did not 
come to fruition, some scholars still believe there are several practical reasons 
for the WTO to regulate investment.2 Most significantly, trade and investment 
are strongly linked in our globalizing world and both complement one another, 
 
 
* Associate at Baker Botts, L.L.P. in New York, NY. J.D., University of Texas School of Law. The 
opinions expressed herein are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of Baker Botts L.L.P. 
The Author would like to dedicate this Article to his loving and incredibly supportive wife, Jingjing 
Liang. The Author would like to thank Dean Lawrence Sager and Professor Victor Ferreres for their 
incredibly helpful assistance in writing this Article. 
1 Efraim Chalamish, Global Investment Regulation and Sovereign Funds, 13 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES L. 645, 659–60 (2012). 
2 See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, Global Governance and the WTO, 45 HARV. INT'L L. J. 303, 307 
(2004). 
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with an increase in one corresponding to an increase in the other.3 Professor 
Jürgen Kurtz describes the convergence of foreign investment and trade in what 
he coins as his double helix metaphor that characterizes the fields of international 
trade and investment as supported by, and connected to, each other.4   
But history has divided these two pillars of our global economy: trade is 
regulated through a multilateral regime under the WTO, while investment is 
instead regulated by thousands of international investment agreements (IIAs), 
primarily bilateral investment treaties (BITs), and decentralized arbitral 
disputes. This Article acknowledges and accepts the characterization of a trade 
and investment as a double helix, but proposes the creation of a separate 
supranational investment organization to serve as a multilateral regulatory body 
on investment, and forum for investment negotiations, while still maintaining 
the economic link between investment and trade—namely, the institution of a 
World Investment Organization.5 
The current bilateral nature of the international investment regime produces 
several structural problems for both investors and states.6 Multilateral rules on 
investment can address these issues regarding the current investment framework 
and the interwoven world of BITs. A Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
(MAI) has been attempted before, but negotiations failed due to a myriad of 
reasons, not all of which pertain to investment principles.7 The creation of a 
multilateral investment agreement requires the right forum for investment 
negotiations to take place—one specifically focused on international investment 
without the interference of trade or other international issues. As discussed in 
this Article, the current international forums and organizations are inadequate 
for investment negotiations, most significantly demonstrated by the previous 
failed attempts at creating an MAI. But the case for the creation of a global 
investment treaty is more compelling than ever, especially with the increase in 
importance of foreign investment in the global economy.8 Therefore, before 
negotiations for a multilateral investment treaty can take place, a World 
Investment Organization (WIO) needs to be established to regulate the growing 
world of foreign investment and provide a forum for multilateral negotiations. 
One prominent argument is that instead of creating a wholly new 
organization, the WTO should expand its jurisdiction to include the regulation 
 
 
3 Lionel Fontagné, Foreign Direct Investment and International Trade: Complements or Substitutes?, 
(OECD Sci., Tech. & Indus., Working Paper No. 1999/03, 1999), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/788565713012. 
4 JÜRGEN KURTZ, THE WTO AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 24 (2016). 
5 A few scholars have noted the idea of creating a World Investment Organization, but this Article 
suggests a more serious and focused discussion to advocate for the creation of this institution. See Reuven 
S. Avi-Yonah, National Regulation of Multinational Enterprises: An Essay on Comity, 
Extraterritoriality, and Harmonization, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 5, 34 (2003). Cf. Merritt B. Fox, 
What's So Special About Multinational Enterprises?: A Comment on Avi-Yonah, 42 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT'L L. 551, 566 (2004) (“It is therefore difficult to see why a world investment organization is 
the right multilateral institution to resolve such conflicts.”). 
6 William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Private Litigation in a Public Law Sphere: The 
Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations, 35 YALE J. INT'L L. 283, 299 (2010) (noting that 
inconsistent decisions threaten the legitimacy of the investment arbitral system). 
7 STEPHEN SCHILL, THE MULTILATERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 356–60 
(2009). 
8 SURYA P. SUBEDI, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: RECONCILING POLICY AND PRINCIPLE 190 
(2d ed. 2012). 
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of foreign investment.9 This is an attractive argument at first glance and will be 
analyzed in this Article. In considering whether to add investment rules under 
the jurisdiction of the WTO, we must first address two problems: should we have 
multilateral rules in investment, and what is the best location for new multilateral 
investment rules?10 This Article proposes three ideas: (1) multilateral rules and 
regulations on investment are necessary to better promote and protect foreign 
investment, (2) one way to do so is to expand the power of the WTO to fully 
regulate foreign investment, and (3) if the expansion of the WTO’s power to 
regulate is shown to be not optimal, proposes the creation of a World Investment 
Organization (WIO) as the organization for the regulation of foreign investment, 
which is essential to the continued prosperity in our ever globalizing economy.11 
Some scholars have suggested the idea of the creation of other issue-specific 
organizations like the WTO,12 but there has not truly been a specific proposal 
for an organization dedicated to investment.13 That is the purpose of this Article, 
to envision both the theoretical and practical reasons for establishing this 
supranational14 organization. 
This Article will start by comparing trade and foreign investment in Part I 
to better understand the arguments that the WTO should in theory regulate 
foreign investment. Trade and investment are strongly linked, but there are still 
distinct differences between the two international legal fields. Part II will focus 
on the compelling reasons for a multilateral regime on foreign investment and 
why a de jure rather than a de facto multilateral investment agreement is needed. 
 
 
9 Guzman, supra note 2, at 307. 
10 Peter Lloyd, When Should New Areas of Rules be Added to the WTO? 4 WORLD TRADE REV. 275, 
275 (2005). 
11 See Efraim Chalamish, The Future of Bilateral Investment Treaties: A De Facto Multilateral 
Agreement?, 34 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 303 (2009). 
12 See, e.g., Steve Charnovitz, A World Environment Organization, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 323 
(2002); Rosa M. Lastra, Do We Need a World Financial Organization, in THE REFORM OF 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE 40, 48–49 (Antonio Segura Serrano ed., 2016) (discussing the 
proposal of a World Finance Organization); Daniel C. Esty, The Value of Creating a Global 
Environmental Organization, ENV'T MATTERS, June 2000, at 13. 
13 See, e.g., WORLD BANK, GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT HORIZONS 2011––MULTIPOLARITY: THE NEW 
GLOBAL ECONOMY 108 (2011), 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGDH/Resources/GDH_CompleteReport2011.pdf (“The existence 
of a formal multilateral institution—a world investment organization analogous to the World Trade 
Organization—may also be an important step forward, especially if such a multilateral forum enhances 
access by developing countries, especially LICs, to global investment capital.”); Nicolette Butler, In 
Search of a Model for the Reform of International Investment Dispute Resolution: An Analysis of Existing 
International and Regional Dispute Mechanisms, in RESHAPING THE INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 353, 561 (Jean E. Kalicki & Anna Joubin-Bret eds., 2015) (“Why is there a World 
Trade Organization (WTO), but not a World Investment Organization (WIO)?”); Avi Nov, The “Bidding 
War” to Attract Foreign Direct Investment: The Need for a Global Solution, 25 VA. TAX REV. 835, 861–
62 (2006). 
14 The term “supranational” is still relatively vague and undefined, but this Article will try to use a 
broader definition to encompass all relevant organizations. For the purposes of this Article, 
“supranational” shall refer to an entity where (1) member states transfer regulatory powers that they 
themselves previously exercised over their nationals, and (2) in exercising these regulatory powers, a 
supranational actor must have independent authority from its member states. See Duncan B. Hollis, Why 
State Consent Still Matters—Non-State Actors, Treaties, and the Changing Sources of International Law, 
23 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 137, 156 (2005); see also Peter L. Lindseth, Supranational Organizations, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 152, 152–54 (Jacob Katz Cogan et al. 
eds., 2016) (“The key distinction between a supranational organization (SNO) and an international 
organization (IO) is the scope of autonomous regulatory power that the body may enjoy.”). 
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Part III will argue for the necessity of a WIO, particularly focusing on the past 
attempts of the WTO to regulate foreign investment. Part IV will focus on the 
creation and structure of the WIO and potential drawbacks to this proposal, 
focusing particularly on the legitimacy challenges to the organization and the 
hold-out problem confronting its establishment. Part V will conclude this 
Article.  
 
 
I. TRADE AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
 
 
Trade and foreign investment are intricately tied together, converging and 
driving our global economy,15 and are often described as “two sides to the same 
coin.”16 Both foreign investment and trade share a common historical origin in 
the international agreements on the treatment of foreigners, but both history and 
practical objectives have divided the two pillars of globalization, with the realm 
of trade focused on liberalization of cross-border trading, and the field of foreign 
investment focused on the protection and promotion of that investment.17 
International investment law has experienced several stages of development 
throughout the past century, from the investment regime’s origin with trade, to 
the two fields’ divergence, and finally to the current reconvergence with trade 
again.18 This Section will provide a brief overview of the similarities and 
differences between foreign investment and international trade to help the reader 
better understand the argument that the WTO should regulate foreign 
investment. 
 
A. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
 
From a strictly legal perspective, trade and investment are separate, but there 
are many reasons to attach them.19 Today’s world economy rests on both trade 
and investment, its “two fundamental pillars.”20 But rather than simply being 
substitutes for each other, foreign investment and international trade 
complement each other and share a fundamental goal in their objectives.21 A 
relationship exists between the two legal systems when the effects originating in 
 
 
15 Press Release, WTO, Foreign Direct Investment Seen as Primary Motor of Globalization, Says 
WTO Director-General (Feb. 13, 1996), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres96_e/pr042_e.htm 
(“Indeed, in today's economy, trade and investment are not merely increasingly complementary, but also 
increasingly inseparable as two sides of the coin of the process of globalization.”). 
16 Markus Wagner, Regulatory Space in International Trade Law and International Investment Law, 
36 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1, 16 (2014). 
17 Nicholas DiMascio & Joost Pauwelyn, Nondiscrimination in Trade and Investment Treaties: 
Worlds Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin?, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 48, 53–54 (2008). 
18 Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty System, 
107 AM. J. INT'L L. 45, 75 (2013) (describing the international investment system’s maturity “from its 
infancy and adolescence into adulthood”). 
19 LONE WANDAHL MOUYAL, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND THE RIGHT TO REGULATE 12 
(2016). 
20 Daniil E. Fedorchuk, Acceding to the WTO: Advantages for Foreign Investors in the Ukrainian 
Market, 15 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 1, 6 (2002). 
21 KURTZ, supra note 4, at 279. 
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one are felt in the area of the other system.22 Trade and investment are 
inextricably related, as foreign investment stimulates exports from investing 
countries and foreign investment complements and supports trade.23 This results 
in a positive correlation between investment and trade flows, and the two are 
mutually supportive.24 Foreign investment expands international trade as foreign 
assets and subsidiaries buy goods and supplies, often from the parent corporation 
in a foreign country.25 The more firms that invest in foreign countries, the more 
those firms generally export as well.26 Trade liberalization further improves 
investor confidence in a foreign country, leading to a greater increase in Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) flows.27 Unlike environment and human rights law, 
states make money through both trade and foreign investment when private 
shareholders in the state gain financial benefits and create jobs, incentivizing 
states to focus on predictability and enforceability.28 
 
B. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TRADE AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
 
While investment and trade are connected in many ways, the two are still 
distinct economic flows.29 Generally, modern trade is about overall welfare and 
the liberalization of trade flows and opportunities, while foreign investment is 
about individual rights with the principles of investment protection grounded in 
fairness.30 Furthermore, trade disputes occur between states, while investment 
disputes pit the foreign investor against a sovereign state.31 Investor’s rights do 
not exist in trade law, and there is no equivalent in trade to the property 
protection contained in most IIAs.32 In the rights of a foreign entity, there is no 
initial fundamental right to trade or to invest in a foreign country, as states have 
the sovereign right to exclude both foreign investors and traders.33 But once an 
investment is made, if the host country expropriates or nationalizes the 
investment, a fundamental property right of the investor has been violated.34 
 
 
22 GREGORY MESSENGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION LAW: EXAMINING 
CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 39 (2016). 
23 Fontagné, supra note 3.  
24 World Trade Organization Working Group on the Relationship between Trade and Investment, 
Communication from the European Community and Its Member States, Checklist of Issues, Agenda Item 
IV: Advantages, and Disadvantages of Entering into a Bilateral, Regional and Multilateral Rules on 
Investment, including from a Development Perspective, ¶ 3, WTO Doc. WT/WGTI/W/89 (Oct. 9, 2000).  
25 Charles O. Roehrdanz, Reducing the U.S.-Japan Trade Deficit by Eliminating Japanese Barriers 
to Foreign Direct Investment, 4 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 305, 305 (1995).  
26 Stephen J. Canner, The Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 657, 659 
(1998). 
27 Susan D. Franck, Foreign Direct Investment, Investment Treaty Arbitration, and the Rule of Law, 
19 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 337, 347 (2007). 
28 Joanna Jemielniak et al., Introduction, in ESTABLISHING JUDICIAL AUTHORITY IN INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC LAW 1, 3 (Joanna Jemielniak et al. eds., 2016). 
29 JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE THREE LAWS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 23 (2013) 
(explaining the differences between investment and trade). 
30 DiMascio & Pauwelyn, supra note 17, at 53–54. 
31 José E. Alvarez & Tegan Brink, Revisiting the Necessity Defense: Continental Casualty v. 
Argentina 34 (N.Y. Univ. Pub. L. & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 261, 2011).  
32 Id. 
33 Samuel K.B. Asante, International Law and Foreign Investment: A Reappraisal, 37 INT'L & COMP. 
L.Q. 588, 616 (1988). 
34 DAVID COLLINS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 16 (2017). 
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However, if a country raises its walls and prevents the continuation of trade into 
its country, no fundamental right has been violated as there is no right to continue 
international trade.35 
Many of the significant differences between trade and investment in their 
regulatory regimes stem from their historical divergence.36 Because of the 
divergence through history, trade and investment today are regulated differently, 
with a centralized WTO regulating trade and a highly dispersed regime 
regulating investment.37 Trade rules and agreements are enforced under the 
WTO through state-to-state dispute settlements, while investment is generally 
regulated through bilateral investment treaties and resolved through investment 
arbitration.38 This difference in policies and regulations is primarily based on the 
different amount of risk and involvement of the two areas of the economy. Trade 
is generally less risky and less involved in the foreign country, as the product is 
built in a third country, and if it cannot be sold in one country, it may be sold in 
another. But investment comes with significantly more risk with much greater 
and longer involvement in the host country.39 
Finally, the impact of trade and the impact of foreign investment differ 
significantly. Trade operates on a more general level, consisting of impersonal 
transactions, while investment is much more intimate and involved with 
extensive commitment in the foreign state.40 Because foreign investment is 
characterized by its “lasting interest,” foreign investment produces far more 
significant impacts on social, economic, and cultural aspects of the host state 
than trade would.41 International investment can produce significant benefits for 
host states, including increased employment and higher capital flow, but it can 
also be harmful to cultural aspects of the host state because of its intimate 
nature.42 Therefore, foreign investment and trade are significantly different in 
their history, their fundamental objectives, and their impact––which is why they 
warrant different international regimes and regulations. 
 
C. CONVERGING NATURE OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT 
 
Despite their historical and practical separation, trade and investment have 
recently been converging (or reconverging) in their international regimes 
 
 
35 See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, National Constitutions, Foreign Trade Policy and European 
Community Law, 3 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 6 (1992) (“But US courts have also held that ‘no one has a vested 
right to trade with foreign nations.’”). Cf. Philip Alston, Resisting the Merger and Acquisition of Human 
Rights by Trade Law: A Reply to Petersmann, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 815, 824–25 (2002) (noting 
disagreement among scholars of whether there is a fundamental right to trade). 
36 Wagner, supra note 16, at 12. 
37 Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The Law and Politics of International Organizations, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 14, at 60, 77. 
38 Sergio Puig, The Merging of International Trade and Investment Law, 33 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 1, 
8 (2015). 
39 DiMascio & Pauwelyn, supra note 17, at 57–58. 
40 See WORLD TRADE ORG., UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, 9–10 (5th ed. 2011), 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/understanding_e.pdf.  
41 JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, THE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW REGIME GOVERNING INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT 18 (2011). 
42 See COLLINS, supra note 34, at 23–26. 
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through the past few decades.43 Arguably, the relationship between trade and 
international investment is stronger today than ever.44 A significant 
commonality between the two regimes continues to be the protection of 
foreigners from unwarranted discrimination.45 Even though trade and 
investment have significant differences, both have the same general end: to 
promote transnational business and globalization46 while eliminating 
discrimination against foreigner investors or traders without encroaching unduly 
on the domestic regulatory sovereignty of states.47 In modern treaties, trade and 
investment are often addressed together and generally have overlapping 
enforcement disputes.48 Additionally, many foreign investments are undertaken 
precisely to foster trade.49 Around half of the world’s trade is between affiliates 
of multinational enterprises, companies that have both trade and investment 
interests.50 
As globalization increased, the relationship between trade and investment 
has become reinforced, with trade inducing investment and investment inducing 
trade.51 Trade facilitation has been shown to be a key factor in creating 
investment flows between countries.52 As noted above, the relationship is 
complementary, but more investment is usually associated with more exports,53 
and the proliferation of cross-border investment and trade has increased the 
integration of trade and investment in global commerce.54 Globalization has thus 
strengthened the relationship between trade and investment.55   
 
 
43 See Roger P. Alford, The Convergence of International Trade and Investment Arbitration, 12 
SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. passim (2013) (focusing throughout the paper on “the overlap and convergence 
between the trade and investment regimes”). 
44 Mary E. Footer, International Investment Law and Trade: The Relationship that Never Went Away, 
in INVESTMENT LAW WITHIN INTERNATIONAL LAW: INTEGRATIONIST PERSPECTIVES 259, 296 (Freya 
Baetens ed., 2013). 
45 Alford, supra note 43, at 40–41. 
46 Puig, supra note 38, at 11. 
47 See DiMascio & Pauwelyn, supra note 17, at 89 (“Both [trade and investment] regimes are 
grappling with the same core issue: the design of a national treatment test that eliminates discrimination 
against foreigners without encroaching too far upon domestic regulatory sovereignty.”). 
48 See Joost Pauwelyn, The Re-Convergence of International Trade and Investment Law: Causes, 
Questions, and Reform, 108 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 255, 256 (2014). 
49 SALACUSE, supra note 29, at 23. 
50 Communication from the Commission to the Council, The European Parliament, The European 
Economic and Social Committee and The Committee of the Regions, Towards a Comprehensive European 
International Investment Policy, at 3, COM (2010) 343 final (July 7, 2010).  
51 See generally YANN DUVAL, ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., GLOB. FORUM ON INT’L INV., 
TRADE AND INVESTMENT LINKAGES AND POLICY COORDINATION: LESSONS FROM CASE STUDIES IN 
ASIAN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2008), http://www.oecd.org/investment/globalforum/40300944.pdf 
(providing an overview of South-Asian exploratory studies on trade and investment, as well as a summary 
of their findings, to demonstrate how globalization has impacted international trade and investment). 
52 Santi Chaisrisawatsuk & Wisit Chaisrisawatsuk, Imports, Exports and Foreign Direct Investment 
Interactions and Their Effects 2 (Asia-Pac.Research & Training Network on Trade, Working Paper 
Series, No. 45, 2007).  
53 See Li-Gang Liu & Edward M. Graham, The Relationship Between Trade and Foreign Investment: 
Empirical Results for Taiwan and South Korea para. 5 (Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ., Working Paper No. 
98-7, 1998). 
54 Greg Tereposky & Laura Nielsen, Coordinated Actions in International Economic Law as 
Illustrated by Investment Treaty Arbitration and World Trade Organization Disputes, in ESTABLISHING 
JUDICIAL AUTHORITY IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, supra note 28, at 119, 119. 
55 KURTZ, supra note 4, at 70. 
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Globalization does not just pertain to the increase of trade and investment 
across borders, but more generally, globalization refers to the interdependence 
and interconnectedness of movement, whether capital, goods, or even ideas.56 In 
essence, globalization reflects the trend towards common, harmonized standards 
and centralization on a global scale, requiring global institutional management.57 
International law develops through influences across different areas, cross-
fertilizing into other international regimes.58 For example, the same event can 
bring disputes under different treaties or in different international legal 
systems.59 Trade and investment disputes are now often pursued in parallel 
proceedings,60 where the same alleged violation of treaties can be viewed as both 
a trade infringement and a foreign investment violation.61 One such example of 
this is the recent proceedings against Australia, with an investment arbitration 
filed under the Australia-Hong Kong BIT,62 and an action initiated in the WTO 
against Australia for the same issue.63   
While there is no direct jurisdictional competition between the regimes of 
trade and investment disputes, because the parties are different in both, there are 
certain tensions and inefficiencies between the two, particularly in the context 
of parallel proceedings.64 This parallel and overlap between trade and 
investment enforcement regimes has led to forum shopping where the claimant 
can move the claim between trade and investment enforcement depending on 
which would provide broader protection.65 Even looking at the WTO dispute 
resolution docket, there is an increasing entanglement of trade and foreign 
investment disputes.66   
Furthermore, both trade and investment have applied rules or adopted legal 
strategies across the two regimes, leading to tribunals borrowing from other 
areas of international law.67 Article 31.3(c) of the Vienna Convention on the 
 
 
56 JAMES CRAWFORD, CHANCE, ORDER, CHANGE: THE COURSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 109 (2014) 
(noting that the “mass movement of persons, capital, ideas and information—summed up as 
‘globalization’”). 
57 Friedl Weiss, The WTO—A Suitable Case for Treatment? Is it ‘Reformable’?, in THE REFORM OF 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE, supra note 12, at 119, 121. 
58 MESSENGER, supra note 22, at 15. 
59 See Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pak., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/13, Decision on the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 147 (Aug. 6, 2003) (“As a matter 
of general principle, the same set of facts can give rise to different claims grounded in differing legal 
orders . . . .”). 
60 Tereposky & Nielsen, supra note 54, at 120–21. 
61 See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Mex., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/2, Award (Sept. 18 2009) 
(compensating the investor for the additional losses related to the investor as a producer and exporter of 
its product into Mexico, demonstrating a crossover between trade and investment law). 
62 Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Austl., Case No. 2012-12 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2017). 
63 Dispute Settlement, Australia–Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, Geographical 
Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS434 (May 5, 2014). 
64 See Brooks E. Allen & Tommaso Soave, Jurisdictional Overlap in WTO Dispute Settlement and 
Investment Arbitration, 30 ARB. INT’L 1, 15 (2014). 
65 See generally David A. Gantz, Dispute Settlement Under the NAFTA and the WTO: Choice of 
Forum Opportunities and Risks for the NAFTA Parties, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1025 (1999) (explaining 
how the overlap in trade and investment provides forum choices that would otherwise not be available).   
66 KURTZ, supra note 4, at 68–69. 
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Law of Treaties specifically provides that interpreters shall “take[] into account 
. . . [a]ny relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between 
the parties.”68 Because of the overlaps between trade and investment, no rule of 
international law can be viewed in isolation, and other international laws may 
need to be taken into account.69 For example, the tribunal in Pope v. Talbot 
looked to prior WTO decisions when interpreting provisions of the NAFTA 
treaty.70 Similarly, the tribunal in S.D. Myers v. Canada explicitly referenced 
decisions by the WTO Appellate Body.71 
Often, trade and investment are regulated in the same free trade agreement, 
such as NAFTA.72 Additionally, trade law and investment law are both under 
the category of public international law and are principally governed by treaties 
entered into by states.73 Due to the similarities and overlap between WTO 
disputes and investment disputes, there has actually been express usage of WTO 
exceptions in investment treaties.74 This is the strongest appeal for having the 
WTO regulate foreign investment: the intimate connection between trade and 
investment and their overlapping jurisdictions. 
But not all within the investment community recognize or adhere to this 
proposal of investment reconvergence with trade. For example, the tribunal in 
Methanex v. US explicitly stated that “the intent of the drafters [of NAFTA was] 
to create distinct regimes for trade and investment .”75 To the tribunal, this was 
due to the distinct placement of words in the treaty and the assumption that if 
the drafters had wanted to incorporate trade law into the agreement, they would 
have expressed this intention.76 Yet cases following Methanex have determined 
that WTO and Global Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) jurisprudence is 
“highly relevant” and can significantly influence investment awards.77 Even 
though the award in Methanex has been cited over 30 times since its decision in 
the roughly 100 investment awards made public, the award has not been 
influential in those subsequent decisions.78 
 
 
 
 
68 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31.3(c), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
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II. COMPELLING REASON FOR MULTILATERAL REGULATION ON INVESTMENT 
 
 
There are several problems with the current international investment regime, 
including inconsistent decisions and an incoherent body of law.79 Some have 
even asserted these problems have created a “legitimacy crisis” in investment 
arbitral law.80 Economic discrimination creates adverse political consequences, 
including political instability.81 An ideal solution to the problems inherent in the 
current investment law regime would be to create a global multilateral 
investment treaty.82 Foreign investment is the “lifeblood of the global 
economy,”83 and multilateral investment rules will promote and protect foreign 
investment. This section will analyze the reasons for and against multilateral 
regulations on investment. 
 
A. IS THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF BITS A DE FACTO MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT? 
 
The international investment regime is often characterized by its 
fragmentation84 due to the over 3,300 international investment treaties in the 
world, including the more than 2,900 BITs.85 This fragmentation of investment 
treaties has created structural problems, the most significant being the creation 
of an inconsistent and incoherent body of investment law.86 While some 
emphasize the problems of fragmentation and the resulting effect on the 
legitimacy of investment law,87 there are several scholars who believe this 
fragmentation actually gives rise to a de facto multilateral agreement or 
regime.88 This argument suggests that because international investment 
agreements are converging, investment treaties and tribunals take the place of 
 
 
79 See, e.g., Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing 
Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1546–47 (2005). 
80 See, e.g., MOUYAL, supra note 19, at 15–16, 16 nn.43–44 (citing scholars who have criticized the 
international investment law regime). 
81 IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE 157 (M. Campbell Smith trans., Allen & Unwin 3d ed. 1917) 
(1795). 
82 SURYA P. SUBEDI, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: RECONCILING POLICY AND PRINCIPLE 190 
(2d ed. 2012). 
83 See Bernardo M. Cremades & David J. A. Cairns, Contract and Treaty Claims and Choice of 
Forum, in ARBITRATING FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES 325, 325 (Norbert Horn & Stefan Kroll eds., 
2004). 
84 See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from 
the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, ¶ 8, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006) 
(defining fragmentation as the “emergence of specialized and relatively autonomous rules or rule-
complexes, legal institutions and spheres of legal practice”). 
85 U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEVELOPMENT, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2016, at 101 (June 
22, 2016). 
86 Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 6, at 299. 
87 See, e.g., J. Calamita, Countermeasures and Jurisdiction: Between Effectiveness and 
Fragmentation, 42 GEO. J. INT’L. L. 233, 237–39 (2011); Jens Dammann & Henry Hansmann, 
Globalizing Commercial Litigation, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 35 (2008); Johanna Kalb, Creating an ICSID 
Appellate Body, 10 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 179, 198 (2005). 
88 SCHILL, supra note 7, at 368 (“To a large extent, the regime established by bilateral investment 
treaties therefore approximates a truly multilateral system which is based on a single multilateral treaty.”); 
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the multilateral investment treaty by making international law and even 
“precedent.”89 Instead of fragmenting in almost infinite ways, these investment 
treaties have converged to contain similar or almost identical structure, content, 
and objective.90 This can be interpreted as an expression that states intend to 
create a uniform framework of international investment rules and principles.91 
Additionally, international organizations, including the U.N. Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), facilitate and actively initiate negotiations 
between countries, working towards a consistent international policy and 
promote nearly identical drafts of BITs, making UNCTAD a functionally 
centralized investment institution in creating a de facto multilateral investment 
agreement.92  
This de facto multilateral investment agreement argument does present a 
certain irony in that BITs are currently converging into similar and even identical 
agreements, yet an MAI has been rejected twice before. However, as discussed 
below, the previous attempts at an MAI did not fail simply because states did 
not want multilateral investment rules, but because other tangential issues 
complicated the negotiations.93 Arguably, the current system of BITs has indeed 
created a de facto multilateral system where they establish uniform general 
principles and rules that govern the investor-state relationship.94 Some scholars 
disagree,95 and believe this argument is “dangerous,” as far as it argues that 
arbitrators should not look to individual BITs but rather to generalized principles 
of international law.96 However, arbitrators do need to often view BITs, not as 
isolated contracts, but in light of other international treaties, recognizing the 
almost identical language and common origin many BITs have with other 
investment agreements.97 The choice for bilateral investment agreements came 
from the failure of the MAI negotiations, not a desire against having multilateral 
rules.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
89 Stephen Schill, The Jurisprudence of Investment Treaty Tribunals, in FOREIGN INVESTMENT, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COMMON CONCERNS 9, 23 (Tullo Treves, Francesco Seatzu & Seline 
Trevisanut eds., 2014). 
90 SCHILL, supra note 7, at 364. 
91 Id. at 16, 364–65. 
92 Chalamish, supra note 11, at 322. 
93 SCHILL, supra note 7, at 356–60. 
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Representative Number of Investment Treaties States Have Signed 
 
States 
Number of BITs 
Signed98 
Number of FTAs 
Signed99 
United States 52 11 
China 128 4 
Mexico 32 6 
United Kingdom 117  
South Africa 49 1 
India 85  
 
B. BENEFITS OF A DE JURE MULTILATERAL REGULATION OF INVESTMENT 
 
So while a persuasive argument can be made for a de facto multilateral 
investment agreement, a de jure multilateral investment agreement with 
supranational regulation has several significant benefits, and the harmonization 
of international investment law into a homogeneous legal framework for 
investment has been promoted both by economists and legal scholars.100 
International governance by general norms and principles is essential for a 
global system to perform its required function of law.101 But our current 
investment regime is simply a wide network of treaties without international 
regulation and no permanent supranational body to apply a set of coherent 
principles.102 States would only create a multilateral investment regime if they 
believed that such a cooperative arrangement would advance their individual 
interests,103 and to negotiate this multilateral investment regime, there needs to 
be a dedicated investment forum.   
The benefits of a multilateral investment agreement include: (1) greater 
transparency, security, and predictability, (2) policy coherence, (3) protection 
for countries not currently signatories to some BITs, (4) elimination of wasteful 
investment incentives, and (5) enhanced credibility of countries attempting to 
attract investment.104 A specific appeal of multilateral investment agreements is 
that they have lower transaction costs––with one multilateral regime, states 
would no longer need to negotiate individual investment agreements or 
 
 
98 Database of Bilateral Investment Treaties, ICSID, 
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“view treaties by parties” and select the countries) (last visited Apr. 20, 2018). 
99 Other Investment Treaties, ICSID, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/resources/Other-
Treaties.aspx (last visited Apr. 20, 2018). 
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101 Anton K. Schnyder & Stefanie Pfisterer, Features of Trade Law Adjudication and Their Impact 
on the Development of Legal Concepts and Precedents, in ESTABLISHING JUDICIAL AUTHORITY IN 
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102 Michael E. Schneider, The Role of the State in Investor-State Arbitration: Introductory Remarks, 
in THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 1, 8 (Shaheeza Lalani & Rodrigo Polanco 
Lazo eds. 2015). 
103 JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 8 (2d ed. 2015). 
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determine which agreement controls a specific issue.105 The rapid growth of 
foreign investment and the proliferation of IIAs has created a system with less 
coherence than the trade system.106 One scholar proposed the idea that individual 
investment agreements actually can lead to rent-seeking and even corruption in 
a game-theory perspective.107 If there is no multilateral agreement, negotiations 
are individual and not guided by international policies, yet a multilateral 
agreement can bind states to these beneficial policies. Arguably the greatest 
benefit of a de jure multilateral investment agreement is the increased security 
of foreign investment and improved predictability and stability in the investment 
environment.108 Multilateral regulation under a supranational organization 
would encourage investment flows and minimize the risk of the protectionism 
that prevents economically beneficial foreign investment.109 While there may be 
a de facto multilateral system through the current bilateral system, it does not 
provide the same benefits or security as a de jure multilateral system would. 
One specific problem brought by the thousands of BITs is the race to the 
bottom phenomenon, where countries compete with one another to attract 
foreign investment, especially among developing states; this competition can 
worsen labor, environmental, and human rights standards.110 This competition 
or incentive escalation causes economic waste and lessening of individual 
protections—issues a multilateral agreement can address by providing one 
uniform standard for states to follow.111 Currently, many states are essentially 
forced to give concessions, including tax incentives, in order to attract foreign 
investment, justified by the argument that other countries provide these 
incentives, leading to a bidding war between states.112 A multilateral agreement 
would provide a path for states to reduce their restrictions and liberalize 
investment, but still be better off, removing the prisoner’s dilemma problem.113 
Additionally, while BITs may have some advantages in flexibility and tailoring, 
not every issue can be regulated at the bilateral level. For example, an MAI could 
be a proper way to create a binding codification of corporate responsibility 
provisions114 or environmental standards. 
One necessary condition for a multilateral agreement and organization is a 
general consensus and accepted rationale for the law.115 As described above, 
investment agreements are converging, often having similar or identical 
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44, 55 (2008). 
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Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 639, 688 (1998) (concluding, after a comprehensive 
analysis of the race to the bottom phenomenon, that the least developed countries should act as a group 
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language and protections. While BITs can provide flexibility in negotiations, 
widespread international investment coordination provides additional benefits 
such as enhancement of the availability of credit and liquidity of assets.116 If 
most model BITs already use identical language, then it would benefit states to 
coordinate investment regulations at the multilateral level to attain the benefits 
of a harmonized system rather than one that may be converging in only a few 
respects.117 
There are several arguments against a universal application of multilateral 
standards in foreign investment, generally focused on the assertion that the State 
will have the additional transaction costs of negotiating a comprehensive 
multilateral investment treaty, a greater amount than negotiating a single BIT.118 
Another counterargument to a multilateral forum or agreement is the idea that a 
multilateral agreement encourages free-riders. Practically speaking, a 
multilateral agreement and dedicated investment forum would reduce 
transaction costs for negotiating investment treaties, but those countries who are 
more active in foreign investment—such as China and the U.S.—would incur 
greater transaction costs than negotiating individual BITs.119 These are some 
drawbacks to any multilateral arrangement, but these would be greatly offset by 
the benefits of having multilateral investment regulations. 
Finally, multilateral rules on investment would reduce the growing body of 
inconsistent investment decisions. Consistency requires that a rule be applied 
uniformly in every similar or applicable situation,120 a principle the WTO 
Appellate Body has embraced.121 Similarly, the principle of coherence––that the 
investment system should make sense as a whole––is integral to the order of 
international law because coherence forms a well-organized structure.122 But 
different interpretations of essentially identical provisions in similar or the same 
BIT—such as the scope of most-favored nation provisions—create a lack of 
coherence and threaten the legitimacy of the investment dispute system.123 One 
of the predominant reasons the WTO dispute system is so popular compared to 
other international courts is the high consistency of the Appellate Body and its 
coherent commitment to precedent.124 As the jurisprudence of the WTO has 
steadily become consistent, the number of cases brought has also declined.125 
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C. BITS ARE GENERALLY IMPOSED ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
One specific drawback to the current investment regime should be discussed 
here, especially with the changing nature of investment flows. While there are 
benefits in using BITs, specifically their ability to provide flexibility for the 
contracting states,126 one major concern with the current system has been that 
BITs often are imposed on developing countries rather than negotiated with 
them.127 Investment treaties were originally designed to protect the property 
rights of foreign investors, motivated by the belief that this protection would 
encourage foreign investment in the host state.128 Theoretically, these BITs are 
reciprocal, but in reality they are often single-sided,129 and capital flows largely 
in one direction.130 In practice, the two contracting states to a BIT often do not 
have shared economic interests, and many least-developed-countries (LDCs) 
have been lured into BITs as they believe it necessary to enhance their credibility 
to attract foreign investment.131 Some of these BITs have not been balanced to 
benefit both parties, and usually benefit the developed country significantly 
more by protecting their investors over the lesser-developed state.132 This has 
resulted in the overwhelmingly majority of treaties becoming manifestly 
unbalanced and imposing obligations solely on the host states.133 Many 
developing states argue that current investment treaties do not satisfy the needs 
of developing countries.134 
It is often argued that LDCs face an uneven playing field in the international 
investment regime, including in the international investment arbitrations.135 If a 
small state holds out, it has more to lose than a developed state, giving the 
smaller state a significant disadvantage in the negotiations.136 This is related to 
the race-to-the-bottom or prisoner’s dilemma argument,137 as LDCs regularly 
sign BITs to advantage themselves over other states, thereby attracting more 
foreign investors and more revenue, but these BITs undermine the independence 
and control over the state’s regulatory power these LDCs fought to attain.138 
Many developing countries have compelling interests to attract foreign 
investment, yet these countries are often forced to make significant concessions 
 
 
126 Kennedy, supra note 104, at 183. 
127 Guzman, supra note 110, at 658. 
128 Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of International Investment Agreements, 12 U.C. DAVIS 
J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 157, 168–69 (2005). 
129 Chalamish, supra note 11, at 309. 
130 Olivia Chung, Note, The Lopsided International Investment Law Regime and Its Effect on the 
Future of Investor-State Arbitration, 47 VA. J. INT'L L. 953, 956 (2007). 
131 José E. Alvarez, A BIT on Custom, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 17, 26–27 (2009). 
132 Eustace Chikere Azubuike, The Place of Treaties in International Investment, 19 ANN. SURV. 
INT'L & COMP. L. 155, 172–73 (2013) 
133 Tarcisio Gazzini, States and Foreign Investment: A Law of the Treaties Perspective, in THE ROLE 
OF THE STATE IN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION, supra note 102, at 23, 23. 
134 Ursula Kriebaum, Are Investment Treaty Standards Flexible Enough to Meet the Needs of 
Developing Countries?, in INVESTMENT LAW WITHIN INTERNATIONAL LAW: INTEGRATIONIST 
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 44, at 330, 331. 
135 José E. Alvarez, The Emerging Foreign Direct Investment Regime, 99 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 
94, 96 (2005) 
136 Chris Brummer, The Ties That Bind? Regionalism, Commercial Treaties, and the Future of Global 
Economic Integration, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1349, 1365 (2007). 
137 Guzman, supra note 110, at 658. 
138 Id. at 666–70. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
30 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L. vol. 8:2 
 
in exchange for attracting developed countries’ foreign investors.139 
Additionally, developing states that do not have a firmly stable legal regime are 
disproportionally exposed to investment arbitration, as they present the very 
political risks that concerns investors.140 Many of these developing countries 
lack the ability and resources to negotiate provisions of developed countries’ 
BITs, such as the U.S. Model BIT.141 
But a multilateral investment agreement can fix this potential problem. 
Foreign investment plays an integral role in enhancing competitiveness, creating 
jobs in states, transferring technology, and removing poverty, but host states 
cannot benefit without the capacity to develop investment policies and 
treaties.142 A supranational organization regulating foreign investment and 
investment agreements can level this playing field, and many collective actors 
in the investment regime can provide a balance to more developed countries.143 
By regulating foreign investment similarly to international trade at the WTO, 
unfavorable investment treaties could be prevented and a more fair and balanced 
multilateral investment regime would protect both foreign investors and state, 
including LDCs. While much of the current hostility towards international 
organizations stems from the understanding that the centralized power is still 
concentrated in their most powerful members, the relative powers of states are 
undoubtedly more equal than before the institution of international 
organizations.144 
 
 
III. NECESSITY OF A WORLD INVESTMENT ORGANIZATION 
 
 
There have previously been arguments for instituting other world 
organizations to regulate different international aspects.145 Scholars have 
queried: “Why is there a World Trade Organization (WTO), but not a World 
Investment Organization (WIO)?”146 In fact, the idea of creating a WIO has been 
briefly noted before,147 with some calling for the creation of this international 
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organization to regulate foreign investment.148 As investment treaties become 
more prevalent, and as global investment flows rise to more than $1.76 
trillion,149 the necessity of an international organization to regulate and promote 
comprehensive investment policies becomes all the more evident. There needs 
to be a comprehensive framework to guide investment law, and the first step is 
to create an adequate forum for investment discussions. 
Probably the best example of the necessity for the creation of a separate 
WIO—and why the WTO and existing bodies are inadequate forums—is to look 
to the failures of previous multilateral investment negotiations. Nowhere is this 
more evident than in the negotiations for an MAI in the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the WTO Doha Round. 
These negotiations for multilateral investment rules did not fail solely because 
of gridlock on investment principles, but because the negotiations took place in 
an unsuitable forum and thereby were complicated by trade disagreements.150 
What is truly needed for negotiations of a multilateral investment system is a 
dedicated forum with wide membership and representation of developed and 
developing states where a broad purpose of harmonizing the investment regime 
can be pursued.151 
Coherent policies and comprehensive regulation of foreign investment 
throughout the world will produce tremendous benefits for both home and host 
countries. Foreign investors want their investments to have low risk, and many 
host countries want to attract foreign investors. A multilateral system would be 
more predictable and generally stable, particularly when investors know the 
interpretation, application, and protection provided by one single multilateral 
agreement rather than the thousands of individual BITs, which should both 
promote and protect investment.152 Under the WIO, the supranational 
organization could monitor state compliance and effectively regulate 
international investment, promoting investment, and providing states with a 
regulatory framework for future actions.153 
 
A. PRIOR MAI NEGOTIATIONS IN OECD AND THE WTO 
 
To understand the need for a wholly separate investment organization, we 
must start with the failure of investment negotiations in other fora. In 1986, the 
United States sought to implement stricter disciplines on investment measures 
related to trade.154 But during the discussions of the Uruguay Round, developing 
countries objected to this, and the discussions resulted in a significantly narrower 
scope.155 In 1991, the OECD began working on an MAI.156 The negotiations 
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began in secret among the members of the OECD from 1995 to 1998, and were 
aimed to develop multilateral rules for international investment.157 Many, 
including the OECD, believed the “time [was] ripe to negotiate a multilateral 
agreement in investment.”158 
While the view of the MAI at the commencement in 1995 was generally 
uncontroversial,159 the negotiations encountered several obstacles going 
forward, specifically the negotiating environment and the content of the 
agreement.160 Because the negotiations were to take place in the OECD, 
developing countries were unrepresented, which was puzzling given the purpose 
of the MAI was to improve investment protections in developing countries.161 
However, the OECD was chosen as the forum to keep the developing countries 
from watering down the protections offered by the MAI.162 Historically, 
developing countries—often the host countries for foreign investment—have 
resisted the development of multilateral investment rules.163Additionally, many 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) opposed the MAI negotiations in the 
OECD,164 and because of the lack of publicity of the negotiations, many felt 
NGOs and the public were excluded from the process.165 In 1998, after a 
concentrated campaign by those against the negotiations, France announced it 
would not support the MAI, and negotiations ended.166 The MAI failed for 
multiple reasons, including the lack of consensus and considerable opposition.167 
Ultimately however, the MAI negotiations at the OECD failed because the 
forum consisted solely of a “rich countries’ club” and was the inappropriate 
forum to negotiate agreements when the purpose of the MAI was to protect their 
investments in developing countries.168 
The push for an MAI occurred again several years later, this time at the 
WTO. In the Doha Declaration, many WTO contracting states recognized the 
need for “a multilateral framework to secure transparent, stable and predictable 
conditions for long-term cross-border investment.”169 But because of the strong 
conflict between the developed and developing states at the Cancun Summit, all 
investment negotiations were effectively removed from the agenda.170 However, 
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this resistance by developing countries was created by other trade issues, 
specifically agricultural subsidies, and showed the need for the focus on trade 
negotiations and the separation of trade and investment rules.171 
While the Doha Round itself may be “dead,”172 the need for an MAI is still 
alive.173 The failed attempts for the MAI have spurred an increasing trend of 
bilateral and regional investment agreements, and this continues to be the 
primary source of investment regulation.174 Neither of the failed attempts should 
be seen as a rejection of multilateralism, but as the difficulty and complexity of 
global investment rules, as discussed in the next section. 
 
B. WHO SHOULD REGULATE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
 
An initial question we must ask is which organization should actually 
regulate international investment and negotiate multilateral rules? Some 
scholars believe the WTO may be the best forum for global regulation and 
negotiations.175 This idea of incorporation in the WTO is “not new,”176 and there 
are several factors that give the WTO a distinct advantage as a forum for 
investment negotiations and multilateral regulations.177 Notably, the WTO 
already covers several areas of international law, it has virtually universal state 
membership, and it has a dispute mechanism to enforce awards.178 Additionally, 
as discussed above, trade and investment are linked in many ways, and as our 
economy becomes more globalized, this connection only becomes stronger. For 
example, investment law must deal with both private investors and public actors 
(states) in disputes, and similarly, the WTO must regulate one category of public 
actors (states), while focusing on the outcomes for private actors.179 Because 
trade and investment are so highly interlinked, by having both regulated under 
the WTO, coherent and consistent policies addressing both regimes can be 
achieved together. Furthermore, the WTO as an organization has experience in 
creating and implementing multilateral agreements.180 It could be beneficial to 
have the WTO regulate both in order to form complementary policies and similar 
practices.181 
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However, in considering the location of multilateral regulations, the primary 
factor should be effectiveness—essentially, can the forum accomplish the 
multilateral regulation effectively and efficiently?182 There are several reasons 
the WTO is not the appropriate forum for negotiations on investment 
agreements.183 One can only look to history to see why: negotiating investment 
agreements in the WTO can be hindered by the intense trade disputes between 
states, as during the Doha Round. And while there is some push for multilateral 
rules on investment, a significant number of WTO members opposed including 
foreign investment as a separate negotiation in the Doha Round,184 further 
demonstrating the need for a separate and exclusive forum for investment 
negotiations. Some scholars have questioned the ability of the WTO to regulate 
and negotiate investment agreements,185 including the political capacity to 
address all issues related to foreign investment.186 Others assert that regulating 
investment under the WTO may “undermine the credibility” of the WTO 
negotiations on world trade issues.187 As with other areas of international law 
such as human rights and environmental policy, the incredible power of the 
WTO has elevated trade issues at the expenses of other fields, including 
international investment.188 Any hard bargaining by the WTO for a single 
undertaking will meet hard resistance due to the political nature of the target 
regulations and their connection to trade.189 
There is a strong link between trade and investment,190 but there is still a 
distinct separation.191 As discussed above, trade occurs between states, while 
foreign investment is generally private actors investing in another state.192 These 
sometimes require different policies and different practices, and while states 
may be open to the free-flow of trade under the WTO, some states may not be 
willing to give up the control over these negotiations. Some states are concerned 
about the WTO commitment to liberalizing free trade, which could translate to 
the investment regime if under the WTO.193 Additionally, while there is a 
positive correlation between trade and investment, the effect of trade policies is 
only one factor in investment promotion.194 On the more practical side, having 
the WTO regulate investment may overwhelm the already high levels of activity 
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at the WTO.195 Admittedly, the WTO could expand its capabilities to include 
investment, but increased trade disputes and negotiations currently keep the 
focus on international trade issues. Some scholars believe that expanding the 
regulatory power of the WTO beyond trade would defeat the purpose and 
effectiveness of the current WTO.196 As a result, both states and private interest 
groups would want to prevent any expansion of regulation beyond trade if that 
would harm the trade-oriented mission of the WTO or undermine the 
organization’s legitimacy.197 
Finally, developing countries participating in the 2001 Singapore 
Discussions were not so opposed to investment negotiations as the issue was 
more focused on agricultural and other trade problems. The investment 
consensus at that time was doomed because developing countries were 
concerned with the lack of comprehensive trade reform and international trade 
relations.198 But the failure to create a multilateral investment agreement does 
not mean states do not have an interest in uniform multilateral investment rules. 
The previous attempts were unsuccessful because of the complexity in creating 
multilateral agreements rather than the differences in international principles.199 
The negotiations for an MAI under the WTO failed primarily because of trade 
disagreements rather than investment issues.200 In fact, the irony described 
above—that states have converged in their principles on foreign investment but 
have rejected an MAI twice before—is a prominent reason that a new forum 
specifically dedicated to foreign investment regulation is needed to create a 
multilateral investment regime. 
Since the WTO may not be the best forum for investment regulation, the 
second question in this analysis moves to: “What could serve as an alternative 
forum to the WTO for international investment regulation?”201 Some scholars 
have suggested the OECD or the G20.202 However, the forum needs to be one 
where developing countries have a legitimate representation, and the G20 and 
the OECD both arguably have forum issues not suitable for these investment 
negotiations, as seen with the initial MAI negotiation in the OECD.203 The focus 
needs to be specifically on investment to ensure the negotiations do not stall due 
to concurrent issues. This is why this Article proposes the creation of a World 
Investment Organization: to create a forum for multilateral investment 
regulation and future negotiations for an MAI. 
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IV. CREATION AND STRUCTURE OF THE WIO 
 
 
This Article asserts that the creation of a World Investment Organization is 
necessary to further the development of foreign investment and act as a forum 
for the negotiations of future multilateral investment agreements. This 
supranational organization is essential because there needs to be multilateral 
regulation of investment treaties and a forum for investment discussion. As 
discussed in the last section, the current organizations are inadequate for 
investment negotiations and regulation, primarily shown by past events and lack 
of movement in the investment field.204 Without this proposed organization, 
investment law will remain stagnant, leading to the further proliferation of BITs 
and the increased dissatisfaction of states with the investment regime.205 As with 
trade, the law came first, and now the WIO is needed to service the development 
of that law.206 It is becoming clear that only increased global cooperation can 
provide an effective strategy for addressing states’ investment concerns.207 
 
A. THEORETICAL PROPOSAL OF THE LEGITIMACY OF THE WIO 
 
While the creation of the WIO would significantly benefit states through 
improving the investment regime, many believe regulation through 
supranational organizations—like the WIO—would threaten the state 
sovereignty.208 The power of states to regulate or stop foreign investment is an 
essential quality of state sovereignty, and a supranational organization like the 
WIO and the multilateral regulation of investment, diminish that state power.209 
Delegation requires state leaders to give up their powers to make law in their 
state and constrains the ability to favor their citizens over others.210 Admittedly, 
international investment law can threaten public law values, including 
democracy and sovereignty.211 Investor-state arbitration is one such situation, 
where investors can bring claims against states before an international arbitral 
tribunal rather than domestic courts, often directly challenging a state’s 
power.212   
While bilateralism allows states to minimize the delegation of power by 
regulating through individual negotiated treaties, multilateralism can address 
many of the concerns of the current investment regime. Professor Stephen Schill 
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eloquently described the difference in relationships between States in 
multilateralism and bilateralism as: 
 
The core difference between multilateralism and bilateralism 
as forms of international cooperation, therefore, concerns the 
nature of the relations among States. While bilateralism puts 
the State and its sovereignty center stage, assumes a primacy 
of national interests, and allows for preferential and 
discriminatory treatment among States depending their relative 
power, multilateralism views States as embedded in the 
international community, stresses the primacy of international 
law over national interests, and presupposes that international 
relations are ordered on the basis of non-discriminatory 
principles that apply to all states.213 
 
The raison d’être for international organizations is to fulfill a specific 
function which is necessary to address problems affecting numerous states.214 
Since the end of World War II, the number of supranational organizations 
dramatically increased due to the growing number of international problems that 
could only be solved through interdependence between states.215 Trade 
liberalization and investment promotion—along with the economic gains 
derived from both—require states to cooperate internationally and invest in 
supranational organizations to govern, and this includes circumscribing some of 
their national sovereignty.216 Any move toward global governance involves 
some decisions further removed from direct democratic input.217 But to gain the 
benefits from this multilateralization of foreign investment, states need to 
delegate some of their powers to outside organizations, such as the WTO, and 
in this proposal, the WIO.218   
Like other supranational organizations, the WIO can be legitimate.219 In the 
political context, legitimacy of a supranational organization refers to 
justification of a government's authority to rule over its people,220 specifically 
the acceptance of political authority221 based on the perception that the actor has 
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a “right to rule.”222 This global governance must receive popular confidence, 
generally evidenced in its acceptance by the member states.223 Therefore, 
legitimacy is largely connected to compliance or obedience,224 and compliance 
creates order, which is essential for a just and stable global society.225 
Functionalist arguments assert that international organizations are justifiable as 
global public goods, yet a growing academic trend flows more towards 
legitimacy based on accountability rather than functionalism.226 
States have a duty to their people to serve the best interests of their 
citizens.227 International investment law is a public good,228 and even the World 
Bank has provided that a “greater flow of foreign direct investment brings 
substantial benefits to bear on the world economy and on the economies of 
developing countries in particular.”229 Likewise, the Havana Charter specifically 
provided that “international investment, both public and private, can be of great 
value in promoting economic development and reconstruction, and consequent 
social progress.”230 With the current trend towards globalization, state borders 
are becoming a less significant barrier to cross-border investment and trade,231 
and the traditional principle of state sovereignty is constricting232 as our world 
moves more towards what Professor Philip Bobbitt calls the “market state.”233 
Because of this, our world is becoming a more international community.234 Yet 
globalization itself impedes states’ ability to pursue policies of its people 
because states are confronted with international problems only solved through 
cooperation.235 Due to this impediment, states need to turn to supranational 
organizations and multilateral regulation, such as the WIO.236  
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If we accept Professor Ronald Dworkin’s premise that each state has a 
general obligation to improve its own legitimacy and promote the status and 
wealth of their citizens, then because of the increasing growth and importance 
of foreign investment in this globalizing world, states have a duty to improve the 
overall international investment system.237 Because the improvement of 
international investment law would benefit the people of the states, if this can be 
done more effectively and efficiently through a supranational investment 
organization—as argued in this Article—then states need to contribute to the 
creation of this WIO.238 Therefore, the legitimacy of the WIO and international 
investment agreements, along with the states involved in these agreements, will 
actually be reinforced due to the international nature of this organization and the 
resulting widespread agreement on investment policies.239 Furthermore, there is 
truly little delegation of actual authority by states in this proposal, as this WIO 
would operate similar to the current framework of investment treaties, but would 
provide a forum for future multilateral investment negotiations.240 Therefore, 
this delegation of state authority would have minimal impact on state 
sovereignty. 
 But the actual ignition of political will for creating this WIO may be 
difficult to find. While there is precedent for the creation of individual forums 
in new areas other than trade-related measures—namely the Bretton Woods 
Conference and the creation of the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank—these organizations were generally created at a time of crisis where there 
was little alternative.241There are many theories surrounding the reasons why 
international organizations are created,242 but whichever theory is correct, 
international legal crises historically have played an important role in the 
formation of supranational organizations.243 That being said, the WTO was born 
not out of crisis, but was created—at least in part—due to the need for states to 
have a predictable international trading system.244  
There is no set blueprint for the creation of a supranational organization, and 
international actors must aim to create this organization to meet its end—namely 
the regulation of investment treaties and a dedicated forum for the negotiation 
of a multilateral investment agreement.245 The WIO can be partly modeled after 
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the WTO, looking to improve upon the evolution of the current international 
body and framing the organization in the investment field. Through an 
international treaty, states can sign onto the WIO and become member states, 
effectively creating a charter like that of the WTO. But states will not create or 
cooperate with supranational organizations except to the extent states perceive 
the organization satisfies their interests,246 and this introduces the next problem 
surrounding this proposal. 
 
B. POTENTIAL HOLD-OUT PROBLEM IN THE CREATION OF WIO 
 
With this proposed creation of the WIO, there are several issues that must 
be considered. The most stringent problem to the WIO and multilateral 
investment regulation is membership. There is no guarantee that there would be 
universal or even plurilateral247 membership, and some countries may hold out 
from signing on to the organization to influence the terms of its creation. Hold 
out problems can occur both before creation, with countries holding out to 
influence negotiations, and after creation, as those countries may have an 
advantage by staying out of the supranational investment organization, incurring 
the benefits of free-riding. Furthermore, it would take time and significant effort 
to achieve similar levels of success as the WTO or other supranational 
organizations,248 and the WIO may not even achieve equivalent success as the 
WTO, as some scholars argue was the case with the International Labour 
Organization.249 
The initial holdout problem would most likely come from developed 
countries rather than developing countries, contrary to what occurred in the MAI 
negotiations. Countries such as China and the U.S. comprise much of the current 
foreign investment flows,250 and these countries would be unlikely to give up 
their negotiating power easily to a supranational organization. Because these 
countries would be necessary in creating a WIO due to the significant investment 
flows generated by their investors, these states would most likely refuse to join 
without significant concessions in their favor.251 Often, more powerful states can 
benefit from fragmentation for several reasons, not the least of which is the 
ambiguity that fragmentation creates surrounding relevant rules, which hampers 
legal efforts to restrain the actions of powerful states.252 Additionally, the United 
States has historically been reluctant to cede power to supranational 
organizations, likely due to the refusal of the U.S. to be bound by international 
organizations, although this reluctance has decreased in the past half century.253 
As a result, some countries would benefit greatly from refusing to participate in 
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the WIO, specifically during the process of creation in an effort to influence the 
organization in a way to gain comparative advantages for their state.254 Even 
after the establishment of the WIO, many states may recognize a free riding 
opportunity. However, with coordinated negotiations within the supranational 
organization, these incentives to free ride could be diminished.255 
 
C. WHY WILL THIS NEGOTIATION WORK WHEN PREVIOUS ONES HAVE FAILED AND 
WHY NOW? 
 
The main proposal in this Article is that by instituting a WIO, future 
negotiations for multilateral investment rules can be achieved because the WIO 
will create a forum amiable to investment negotiations and separate from trade 
issues. Without this multilateral organization, future development of the 
investment regime may be impeded, reducing the regime’s ability to withstand 
challenges––including challenges to its legitimacy.256 To move forward in 
improving international investment law, rules need to be consolidated, and a 
coherent regulatory framework and body of law must be produced. The 
proliferation of BITs and the multitude of investment tribunals have created 
incoherent principles and structural problems, particularly inconsistent arbitral 
decisions and divergent treaty interpretations.257 
So the final question remains: why would negotiation within the WIO work 
when there have been several attempts at similar multilateral negotiations in the 
past that have failed? One such reason is that a shift in foreign investment flows 
has occurred since the last time multilateral rules were attempted.258 Developing 
countries now both receive foreign investment and invest in other countries, with 
investment flows moving both directions.259 Investment agreements are no 
longer only brokered between traditional investment-exporting countries; BITs 
now are signed between developed countries, and are increasingly being 
negotiated between developing countries.260 The MAI failed partly because the 
world was divided between investor and investing countries, but that “line has 
now blurred.”261 
Second, this is not a multilateral investment agreement yet. This is simply a 
proposal to create a supranational forum for multilateral discussions and 
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regulations in the view that a multilateral agreement will be instituted in the 
future. Current forums are not suitable to foreign investment discussions, as 
demonstrated by the past, and the argument here is that the creation of a new 
forum strictly dedicated to foreign investment will aid in the creation of a 
multilateral investment agreement. The first step to overcoming the problems of 
fragmentation is to bring the actors together, and then the common rules can be 
identified, and compatibility can be obtained.262 This will be done by instituting 
a WIO. 
Additionally, with the immense increase in foreign investment, information-
gathering becomes an integral part in early detection of potential risks, 
particularly in international financial regimes.263 States would greatly benefit 
from delegating this information-gathering function to a supranational body with 
the organization and resources to effectively collect and analyze this data. 
Additionally, while there is no blueprint for creating a supranational institution, 
international investment law can find many pertinent lessons by looking to the 
evolution of the GATT into the WTO.264 
 
D. NEGOTIATING A COMPREHENSIVE MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY 
 
Once this WIO is instituted, negotiations for a multilateral investment treaty 
can begin. There are many broad policy concerns regarding a multilateral 
regime. First, any multilateral agreement on investment must reflect the interests 
of developing countries, particularly due to their past opposition to parts of the 
previous draft MAI.265 The parts of the multilateral investment treaty would need 
to address similar areas that BITs currently do, and with the converging 
principles in BITs, this would be a starting point for negotiations. Most 
significantly, the scope of the agreement would need to be addressed, 
particularly the definition of “investment” and “investor,” while broad across 
most investment agreements, may need to be constricted to narrow their 
scope.266 Additionally, nearly all BITs provide investors with a mechanism for 
bringing claims before an arbitral tribunal, often the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), and generally under ICSID Rules, 
U.N. Commission on International Trade Law, or International Chamber of 
Commerce rules.267 But other provisions do not necessarily have widespread 
agreement, including the application of non-discrimination protections to pre-
admission, such as exclusion of FDI from certain industries, or post-admission, 
including nationalism and expropriation.268 The previous MAI draft applied non-
discrimination standards to both pre- and post-admission investment.269 
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As BITs are generally uniform and have the same core provisions, this 
makes it difficult for many countries to object purely on a policy basis to having 
universal standards since in practice, BITs are already uniform.270 But this does 
not necessarily mean this will prevent those objections, particularly on specific 
issues that are not widely agreed upon such a pre- and post-admission investment 
protections. While BITs generally have similar or identical language, there are 
still some variations, and these disagreements can be sticking points in 
negotiating an MAI. However, this is precisely why the WIO is needed, to 
provide a dedicated forum for these discussions to take place outside the 
influences of other international issues. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
Trade and investment are strongly connected and will continue to converge 
with the increase in globalization. But for this interconnectedness to be effective, 
both trade and investment law need to be promoted and advanced. Without an 
international forum for investment discussions and multilateral regulation of 
investment, international investment law will stagnate and simply remain a 
fragmented landscape of bilateral treaties, and the discontent of states with 
current investment regime will only grow. For the trade and investment “double 
helix” envisioned by Professor Kurtz to fully effectuate, the WIO would need to 
be created to aid investment law in its maturity. 
This Article proposed a somewhat radical idea of creating a World 
Investment Organization. Because there is currently no international regulation 
of investment treaties, nor an exclusive investment forum for multilateral 
negotiations, a supranational organization such as this would greatly improve 
international investment law and further promote foreign investment, the “ 
‘neglected twin of trade’ — at least in terms of its multilateral regulation.”271 
While there are several problems that may affect the process of establishing this 
institution, including challenges to its legitimacy and problems with hold-out 
states, the benefits of a multilateral investment agreement would greatly 
outweigh those issues. A WIO is necessary to address the problems of the current 
investment system, and states will have increasing pressures and incentives to 
establish this supranational organization. Our times need a new economic order, 
and we need supranational organizations such as the WIO to govern this new 
order.272 
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